Overview

Reflector contains a monolithic FIX message parser which interprets sequences of bytes and translates them into possible order actions.

It is compatible with all current FIX protocol versions without needing to differentiate them. It handles all current FIX venues (except RBS RFQ) while rarely differentiating them. It performs deserialization, field parsing, order action interpretation, and constraint/error checking all in one go. It preserves all field locations, so that it can write back to arbitrary fields later if necessary. Since this is a real time application, Reflector does all this without touching the heap.

Every Session Type except DATA requires inspection by the FIX Parser: LOGON, PASS_TKR, PASS_MKR, TAKER, MAKER, & COPY.

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• Outbound messages are requests, since the whole objective of this mechanism is to constrain the trader under the weight of risk limits.
• Inbound messages are updates, as the venue is, by definition, a source of truth.

Discipline

Reflector is only allowed to alter the semantics of outbound FIX messages.

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Parser behaviour necessarily varies depending on the 

Session Type

Logon

Outbound

On the outbound direction of a session in logon state, the only allowed messages are Logon[A] and Logout[5]. Logon[A] messages are inspected. Logout[5] messages are ignored. If any other message is received, the result is session termination. On an outbound Logon[A] message, a credential is deduced and looked up using the ordered triple { ExchangeCode, COMP_ID, SUB_ID }.

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Inbound

On the inbound direction of a session in logon state, the only allowed messages are Logon[A] and Logout[5]. Logon[A] messages are inspected. Logout[5] messages are ignored. If any other message is received, the result is session termination.

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Password Change

Outbound

EBS & Reuters have a unique password changing process whereby traders must log in to change passwords with a UserRequest[BE] message. The SessionTypes PASS_TKR & PASS_MKR handle this contingency for PBs who do not wish for their clients to know the real logon passwords:

Inbound

Inbound messages on tcp sessions in password changing mode are completely unscreened with one exception: on detection of Logon[A] message, the stream terminates immediately.

Taker

On an outbound taker stream, potential order actions are inspected.

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Outbound

NewOrderSingle[D], QuoteResponse[AJ], & OrderCancelReplaceRequest[G]

Processing Sequence

On an outbound risk-carrying Taker message, the parser acts as if the following events occur in sequence:

1. Attributes are read in.
2. Venue-specific patches are applied.
3. Unsupported features: If any of the following conditions hold, the order action will be blocked. Unless specified, the stated reason for rejection will be serialized as (Z_UNSUPPORTED):
   1. If OrdType[40] has value FOREX_SWAP[G]
   2. If any of these fields are present: Price2[640], OrderQty2[192], SettlDate2[193], AllocAccount[79]
   3. If Symbol[55] (SecurityID[48] in LMAX44) did not resolve to a valid currency pair (Z_PRODUCT_UNKNOWN)
   4. If NoLegs[555] is present and contains any nonzero value
4. Sanity: If any of the following conditions hold, the order action will be blocked. Unless specified, the stated reason for rejection will be serialized as (Z_NON_CONFORMING):
   1. If PossDupFlag[43] or PossResend[97] is present and has value Y
   2. If any of the required fields are missing
   3. If account resolution failed on a credential with multiple overloaded accounts set up (Z_ACCOUNT_UNKNOWN)
   4. For non-market orders, if Price[44] is missing or more than a factor of 2 outside of reference rate (Z_PRICE_RANGE)
   5. If OrderQty[38] did not contain a positive scalar amount (Z_QUANTITY_RANGE)
   6. If Currency[15] is missing on an order referencing a quote (Z_DEALT_CCY_UNKNOWN)
   7. If Currency[15] is present but did not refer to either of the currencies in the symbol (Z_DEALT_CCY_UNKNOWN)
   8. For Spot orders, if a settle date cannot be computed for the state symbol (Z_SETTLE_DATE_UNKNOWN)
   9. For non-Spot orders, if settle date computation failed sanity checks (Z_SETTLE_DATE_UNKNOWN)
   10. If Side[54] contained a value other than BUY[1] or SELL[2]
5. A speculative order state is constructed.

6. Order state is sent to the Risk Instance for assessment. On failure, order action will be blocked with whichever reason it provides.

Taker Blocking

When an outbound taker message is found to be illegal, the following taker block procedure is performed:

• The following fields, if existent, are zero-filled: OrderQty[38], OrderQty2[192], BidSize[134], OfferSize[135], BidSize2[...], OfferSize2[...], LegQty[687], LegOrderQty[685], AllocQty[80], LegAllocQty[271].
• QuoteRespType[694], if existent, will be filled with PASS[6].
• If the blocked message was a OrderCancelReplaceRequest[G], it will be changed to a OrderCancelRequest[F].
• For specific venues, if these actions are insufficient, Reflector will also fill any provided QuoteID[117] with "_".

OrderMassActionRequest[CA]

The only supported MassActionType[1373] is CANCEL[3]. All appearances of that field will be coerced to the supported value.

Inbound

On an inbound taker stream, Reflector accepts updates (including rejects) to live orders and fill notications.

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Reflector models live and filled outlays separately. This means that on an ExecutionReport[8], two independent potential updates of separate records could be performed: one to update the state of the live order, another to insert a fill. No attempt is made to track which fill belongs to which order.

ExecutionReport[8] & TradeCaptureReport[AE]

A TradeCaptureReport[AE] is a pure fill update, uniquely identiable by its ExecID[17].

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OrderMassCancelReport[r] & OrderCancelReject[9]

On OrderMassCancelReport[r], on every ClOrdID[11] and OrigClOrdID[41] observed, the corresponding live order is looked up and invalidated. On OrderCancelReject[9], no order actions are taken; but if fields ClOrdID[11] and Text[58] exist, and Reflector has previously blocked an order identified by ClOrdID[11], then the value of Text[58] will be replaced by Reflector's ErrorCode.

Reject[3] & BusinessMessageReject[j]

Reject[3] & BusinessMessageReject[j] are handled in the exact same way. If a corresponding live order is found when RefSeqNum[45] will be looked up, it will be invalidated. Additionally, if Reflector has previously blocked an order identified by RefSeqNum[45], then the value of Text[58], if it exists, will be replaced by Reflector's ErrorCode.

Maker

Outbound

On an outbound maker stream, only ExecutionReport[8] & ExecutionAcknowledgement[BN] are meaningful to inspect.

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ExecutionReport[8] & ExecutionAcknowledgement[BN]

Takers need to deal with both orders and executions (fills). Makers deal with only executions, but must handle the rare case where they could be rolled back.

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1. Attributes are read in.
2. Venue-specic patches are applied.
3. Unsupported features: if any of the following conditions hold, order action will be blocked with Z_UNSUPPORTED:
   1. If any of these fields are present: Price2[640], SettlDate2[193], AllocAccount[79]
   2. If Symbol[55] did not resolve to a valid currency pair
   3. If NoLegs[555] is present and contains any nonzero value
4. Sanity: if any of the following conditions hold, order action will be blocked with Z_NON_CONFORMING:
   1. If PossDupFlag[43] or PossResend[97] is present and has value Y
   2. If any of the required fields are missing
   3. If Currency[15] is missing on an order referencing a quote
   4. If Currency[15] is present and referred neither of the currencies of the symbol
   5. If Side[54] contained a value other than BUY[1] or SELL[2]
   6. If LastPx[31] is more than a factor of 2 outside of reference rate
   7. If LastQty[32] did not contain a positive scalar amount
5. A speculative execution state is constructed.
6. Execution state sent to risk backend for assessment. On failure, exec action will be blocked with whichever reason the risk backend provides.

Maker Blocking

When an outbound maker execution message is found to be illegal, the following maker block procedure is performed:

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• Venue ACKs accepts, rejects, and errors.
• Venue ACKs only rejects and errors.
• Venue ACKs only errors.
• Venue ACKs nothing, but emits an order timeout afterwards.
• Venue terminates session in some way.

Inbound

On an inbound maker stream, we basically check for various ways an outbound accept could be invalidated:

ExecutionReport[8] & ExecutionAcknowledgement[BN]

Some venues use ExecutionReport[8] as new (FXall), those are skipped. Some venues use ExecutionReport[8] as ack, those are inspected. Some venues use ExecutionReport[8] as both new and ack (Hotspot), those are included inspected too. Additionally, if Reflector has previously blocked an execution identified by ExecID[17], then value of Text[58], if it exists, will be replaced by Reflector's ErrorCode.

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• Z_EXEC_TIME_OUT - The confirm referred to an order that has been timed out. The confirm is ignored.
• Z_EXEC_EXPIRATION - The confirm arrived after the associated maker exec has already been made permanent. The confirm is ignored.
• Z_EXEC_ID_DISLOCATION - The conrm ExecID[17] matches something other than what was on record. The confirm is ignored. This is the most serious and least likely of the errors.
• Z_EXEC_NOT_FOUND - Rogue confirmation. No record of associated maker exec existed; hence it was 'invented' by the exchange. The execution is accepted, and immediately made permanent.
• Z_EXEC_REVISION - The confirm matches everything (exec id, order id, product, side), but quantity is different. The associated maker exec is updated. Not really an 'error' per se.

DontKnowTrade[Q]

ExecID[17] will be looked up and execution invalidated if not already invalid. Additionally, if Reflector has previously blocked an execution identified by ExecID[17], then value of Text[58], if it exists, will be replaced by Reflector's ErrorCode.

OrderTimeOut[OT] & Currenex OrderTimeOut[U3]

ClOrdID[11] will be looked up and every associated execution invalidated. For Currenex only, U3 will be looked up instead of OT.

Reject[3] & BusinessMessageReject[j]

Reject[3] & BusinessMessageReject[j] are handled in the exact same way. If a corresponding execution is found when RefSeqNum[45] will be looked up, it will be invalidated. Additionally, if Reflector has previously blocked an execution identified by RefSeqNum[45], then the value of Text[58], if it exists, will be replaced by Reflector's ErrorCode.

Copy

SessionType::COPY denotes special sessions reserved for dropcopy fill injection into Reflector.

Counter-Currency Trading

Dealt currency status is tricky to determine because traders and venues alike tend to omit the Currency[15] field. This is fine when the intention is to convey the base ccy order that it defaults to anyway, but sometimes the field is similarly omitted for a term ccy order, for example when this is established in a previous message or a different (quote) stream.

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Account Multiplexing

Some customers wish to map to multiple accounts per session, through Account[1] or otherwise. This is supported through Reflector, but it must know the complete set of allowed account tag values and what risk pool they belong to.

On a credential with account multiplexing set up, any order submission with a missing or unknown account tag will be rejected.